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Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework 
 
 
Terrorists learn every day to gain further knowledge on how to achieve their 
violent objectives. Consequently, understanding terrorist learning forms a crucial 
part of the fight to counter terrorism. However, whilst existing literature within 
terrorism studies has examined a number of different parts of the learning 
process there currently fails to exist a comprehensive framework to encompass 
the learning process as a whole. This article will rectify this oversight by drawing 
upon wider learning literature to develop a new analytical framework for terrorist 
learning that provides a definition, considers the actors involved and identifiies 
processes and outcomes. Consequently, the full landscape of current and 
potential research in this important area is revealed. 
 
 
Just as states, government departments and national armed forces learn so do 
violent non-state actors. For all of these actors learning is an ongoing process to 
improve ability and performance, and also a discontinuous process as part of a 
problem-solving agenda.1 The aim of learning is to build on successes, avoid 
past pitfalls and stay ahead of the learning curve of competitors and enemies in 
terms of approaches, tactics, technology and skills. It is about increasing 
accuracy and efficiency and, therefore, in this sense learning can act as both a 
form of intelligence and a force enabler and multiplier.  
 
It is clear that terrorists are learning right now from multiple sources. They are 
learning from history,2 their own experiences, the experiences of other hubs, 
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cells or networks within their organisations,3 from other terrorist organisations,4 
experts,5 states, the private sector6, media7 and counter-terrorist actors.  
Recent developments involving high profile terrorist groups underline the role of 
learning in the production of tactical innovation and strategic adaptation. 
Dissident republican actors in Northern Ireland continue to reveal a learned 
understanding of past IRA tactics. Islamic State (commonly known as ISIS) is 
learning to embrace regional franchises. So-called ‘lone actor’ terrorists, like the 
Boston marathon bombers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, auto-didactically 
learn bomb-making techniques over the internet. Hamas is learning to exist in 
different operational environments and changing Israeli tactics.8 Al Qaeda’s 
central hierarchy has fragmented into regional hubs that are learning how to 
localise activities. The Taliban are currently closely observing and learning from 
the actions and successes of ISIS, as are Jemmah Islamiah in South East Asia – 
who previously learned from Al Qaeda, whilst the New IRA and Continuity IRA 
are learning from the Taliban in regards to their use of explosively formed 
projectiles (EFPs) – horizontally fired homemade rockets.9 Hezbollah connect 
with outside experts to obtain required learning whilst many terrorist actors 
study state security forces in order to learn from them. As Forest adequately 
noted, “successful terrorist attacks are rarely accomplished by idiots”.10  
 
An urgent response to such learning is needed and therefore it is critical for 
counter-terrorist actors to understand not only why terrorists learn, from where 
terrorists learn but also, and perhaps more significantly, how terrorists learn. By 
identifying who is learning and the processes and outcomes of terrorist learning 
weaknesses within the organisations can be exposed and exploited to disrupt 
further learning capabilities. Such disruption not only reduces the terrorist’s 
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force enabler but it also disturbs the mechanisms in place for the dissemination 
of learning to large numbers, that improves terrorist organisation resilience. 
Furthermore, reducing terrorist learning capabilities allows counter-terrorist 
groups the time and space to catch up, overtake or extend their lead on the 
learning curve.  
 
In order to comprehensively investigate how terrorist actors learn a new 
framework of analysis is required. Whilst academic literature has examined 
learning by and within state actors, and some has explored learning in terms of 
state responses to violent non-state actors,11 scholars have largely overlooked 
the vitally important work of specifically researching terrorist learning.12 This 
paper aims to rectify such an oversight by drawing upon the wider learning 
literature in general, and state-based learning in particular,13 to forge a new 
framework for the analysis of terrorist learning. This framework will define what 
is meant by learning, who are the agents of learning (the learners), and 
establish the processes and outcomes of terrorist learning for future analysis. As 
a result the framework reveals a landscape of research in this area that can be 
utilised by academics and practitioners to aid understanding and the 
investigation of learning by violent non-state actors in the future. 
 
Existing approaches to learning 
Defining terrorist learning 
There is a vast literature on learning, with its study traceable back to the 
epistemological debates of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. It is a concept that has 
transcended many disciplines and has now become a discipline within itself in 
the form of education studies.14 However, the extensive learning literature has 
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not been rigorously or consistently applied by terrorism studies scholars. Part of 
the challenge for the study of terrorist learning is that learning remains 
notoriously difficult conceptually and methodologically for research; a challenge 
that is compounded by access and ethical difficulties in the study of terrorists. In 
the analysis of state-based learning Levy has claimed learning to be a 
“minefield” whilst Tetlock has described learning as conceptually “elusive”.15 
Consequently, scholars studying state learning have utilised a range of 
definitions and approaches and this research will draw upon a number of these 
to provide a comprehensive definition that is applicable at the sub-state level. In 
particular, such a definition will consider and endeavour to bring together ideas 
from cognitive psychology (but extend the definition beyond simply the 
appropriation of new knowledge)16 , behaviourist based learning theories (that 
emphasise reinforcement and practice),17 organisational theorists (that include 
changes in institutional procedures as part of their definition of learning),18 and 
constructivist approaches (that argue that learning has an effect upon beliefs, as 
well as behaviour). In particular, in terrorist organisations heavily influenced by 
ideology the impact of learning upon beliefs as well as behaviour can be crucial.  
 
This paper also rejects definitions that suggest a teleological condition of 
learning whereby it is defined as the use of new knowledge to change beliefs or 
behaviour in a manner that increases effectiveness through better accuracy or 
efficiency.19 For the researcher, these definitions are problematic because of the 
requirement to develop a normative, and standard, definition of what is deemed 
to be “accurate” or a clear understanding of goals in order to assess “efficiency”. 
In both cases the criteria need to be tangible and explicit, thus leaving this 
definition more suited to the study of institutions that formalise goals and 
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indicators of success. Such a definition may be possible to some extent in the 
study of terrorist learning by groups that codify their ideas in manuals, 
handbooks and trade press, such as periodicals like Al-Qaeda’s In the Shadow Of 
the Lances or Islamic State’s Dabiq, but it is not universally applicable. In 
addition, this definition assumes that learning only occurs when an improvement 
is made. Whilst this may be the aim of learning it is not possible that this can 
always be the outcome, but learning has still occurred. 
 
Finally, a number of learning theorists have defined learning by differentiating 
the concept from that of change. Levy, for example, rejects the approach of 
Bayesian economics that associates learning with a consistent change, and is 
clear to distinguish learning from policy change. He explains that change can 
occur for a number of reasons other than learning whilst learning can result in 
an outcome other than change, including the reinforcement of existing policies.20 
Organisational theorists also stress this difference and explain that change can 
occur due to shifts in personnel, changes in legislation or as the result of 
unintended consequences.  Instead, for this paper, change must be understood 
as one possible outcome of learning. In the past, using the two concepts as 
synonyms has only sought to encourage the study of a particular outcome rather 
than the wider learning process. For example, in several important recent 
additions to the terrorist literature a number of scholars have focused solely 
upon outcomes such as innovation, change or adaption.21 Now the challenge 
must be to holistically interpret the learning process that leads to the production 




The most comprehensive study of terrorism learning thus far has been produced 
by researchers at the RAND Corporation, who have also posited the most explicit 
definition of terrorist learning within the limited field of literature.22 They have 
defined terrorist learning as: “sustained changes that involve intentional action 
by or within a group at some point...Furthermore, we categorise as learning only 
changes that are beneficial to the terrorist group.”23 As such their definition 
relies upon change as an indicator of learning, as rejected by organisational 
theorists, and applies an accuracy and efficiency criterion, thus ignoring the 
possibility that learning incorrect lessons can also be regarded as learning.  To 
overcome these contrasting approaches a new definition must be established.  
 
Understanding the agent of terrorist learning 
 
Having developed an understanding of what learning is it is also important to 
distinguish who is the agent of analysis in terrorist learning – the learner. We 
identify four principle agents of learning in the broader learning literature that 
have a significant impact on terrorism: the individual, the group, generations 
and organizations.  
 
Firstly, the majority of all learning literature focuses on the individual as the 
most significant learner; from cognitive psychology, 24 to economics25 and 
international relations. 26 Equally, the role of the individual learner – from the 
leadership to the foot soldier – has been recognised by some scholars in 
terrorism studies. Selth argues that the individual learner should not be 
underestimated and uses the example of the former IRA Chief of Staff, Sean 
MacStiofain, who set-out to learn all he could from Cypriot EOKA guerrilla 
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inmates whilst he was incarcerated alongside them in a London prison in the 
1950s.27 Kitfield also stresses the importance of Osama Bin Laden’s learning for 
al Qaeda,28 whilst Forest emphasises that individual learning is significant 
beyond the leadership of terrorist organisations by citing examples of those 
motivated by, but not connected to, extremist ideology; the 7/7 London 
bombers, Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, and white supremacist 
Buford Furrow.29 Most recently the attacks in Paris against Charlie Hebdo 
reemphasised the threat of “lone actor” attacks by those individuals who have 
learned terrorism without formal affiliation to a terrorist organisation.30  
 
The second key learner, identified by social psychologists, sociologists and 
anthropologists, has been that of the group. A handful of terrorism studies 
scholars have also drawn upon social learning literature to analyse groups of 
terrorists as a singular agent of learning, or learner. Hamm, for example, drew 
upon criminological literature on social learning to examine how terrorists 
learned to commit crimes.31 A group of terrorists differs from a terrorist 
organisation because the relationship between the individuals is social rather 
than structural. Social psychologists and sociologists emphasise the importance 
of social and cultural factors that occur during interaction that impacts the 
learning process, such as the use of language. The father of Social Development 
Theory, Vygotsky, suggests that learning occurs in a cultural context through 
social interactions that contribute to cognitive development.32 The impact of the 
social process is often a homogenisation of individual learning to group learning 




Thirdly, other groups of individual terrorists may also be considered learners in 
their own right. Groups can be bound outside of social interactions by a shared 
identity. Learning in demographic groups, for example, is particularly used by 
electoral and domestic political analysts.33 One cohort, which is bound together 
by a temporal identity, is generations; individuals who are within an age range 
at a particular point in time. Generational learning has been studied within 
education studies, economics and political science but has predominantly been 
ignored by researchers of state-based and terrorist learning.34 Yet generations 
are significant learners and interaction between two generations can often result 
in mutual learning. In terrorism these interactions regularly occur through 
conversations in person and online and through the exchanging of war stories 
during training.  
 
The final learner is that of the organisation. In fact, the majority of existing 
terrorist learning literature, including the seminal RAND study, has drawn upon 
organizational theory35 to consider terrorist organisations as the key learner.36 
Similarly, much of the literature that examines state responses to terrorism has 
also used organisational theory to examine learning37 and the result is an 
emphasis upon the impact of the systems, structures, resources and influences 
of the organisation that reframes individual learning in order to achieve the 
organisational objectives.38 Such analysis is important in the examination of 
large, homogenous and formal organisations, but disregards the flexibility and 
informality that is often more prevalent in terrorist, or sub-state, actors than 
within state-based actors. As a result, a new analytical framework of terrorist 
learning must bring together all four learners – individual, social, generational 




Establishing the processes of terrorist learning 
The literature on processes of learning is dominated by the fields of psychology, 
education studies and organization theory. Whilst behavioural psychologists such 
as Pavlov, Thorndike and Skinner pioneered three different understandings of 
the process of learning – classical conditioning, operant learning and 
instrumental learning respectively39 – cognitive psychologists, such as Piaget,40 
have rejected these ideas to follow a rationalist epistemological approach that 
likens learning to an information processing model of inputs, memory and 
recall.41 The organisational theorists Levitt and March have also utilised the 
cognitivists’ approach to memory to develop and analogous process of 
organisational learning. They equally distinguish learning as a three stage 
process; recording an experience, conserving the experience and retrieval of the 
experience.42 
 
In education studies, particularly within the education of adults, there is also a 
constructivist approach to the learning process, whereby learners create 
knowledge through the seeking of meaning of their own experiences. 
Consequently, learning is an experiential, active and constructive process but 
constructivists ignore the possibility of passive learning through culture, 
language, history and ideology.43 For Siemens, the constructivist approach to 
learning has developed further in the digital age to focus more upon the 
connection of information and actively seeking this knowledge. This approach to 
the learning process, known as connectivism, draws upon chaos theory and 
argues: “Learning (defined as actionable knowledge) can reside outside of 
ourselves (within an organization or a database), is focused on connecting 
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specialized information sets, and the connections that enable us to learn more 
are more important than our current state of knowing.”44 Such an understanding 
of the learning process would be particularly interesting for those studying the 
exchange of terrorist knowledge through the internet, or terrorist organisations 
that seek outside expertise.  
 
Organizational theory approaches to learning have been influenced by 
cognitivism, behaviourism, constructivism and connectivism, and have more 
clearly identified learning as a process with different stages. Huber, for example, 
argues that learning occurs in a four stage process; knowledge is acquired, 
knowledge is shared through information distribution, the information is 
interpreted in order to become understood and is stored for future use in some 
form of organisational memory.45 This definition is useful because, as it draws 
upon a number of influences, it can be applied to all four of the identified 
learners within terrorist learning. It is also this definition that appears to have 
influenced the RAND study on terrorist learning, as it uses the same component 
stages within its analysis.46 However, the interpretation of knowledge is 
immutable and immeasurable, and forms part of knowledge acquisition; it is not 
a separate stage. In addition, the distribution of knowledge needs to be 
devolved into two stages of the process; distribution and implementation of the 
lesson. Consequently, a new analytical framework is required that builds upon 
the work of Huber but considers whether each stage of his learning process is 
necessary or whether additional stages are required when applied to terrorism.  
 
Establishing the outcomes of terrorist learning 
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The outcome of terrorist learning is lessons; lessons that have different 
characters and impacts. In the wider learning literature both the character and 
the impact of lessons is examined. In examining the character of lessons three 
considerations are made. Firstly, a normative approach distinguishes the lesson 
as positive or negative. Positive lessons are those that result from learning 
where events have gone well, often leading to the impact of repeating behaviour 
or reinforcing existing beliefs. Negative lessons result from learning where 
events have not gone as anticipated. Consequently the impact usually involves 
different beliefs and behaviours emerging in similar situations. Many academics 
who focus on the learning mechanisms within state institutions argue that the 
learning process occurs more often in response to failure than success, thus 
leading to the majority of lessons being negative in character.47  
 
The second consideration to the character of a lesson is whether it is tacit or 
explicit. Explicit lessons are able to be codified whilst tacit lessons cannot. In 
terrorist learning literature Kenney uses this distinction to apply to types of 
knowledge, “techne” and “metis”, whereby techne are skills that can be taught 
through traditional study and metis are skills gained through engagement in 
activity and practice.48 In terrorist learning an explicit lesson may be one relating 
to the technical knowledge of bomb making, whilst a tacit lesson would focus 
upon the instinct involved in surveillance operations. Linked to this is the 
differentiation between formal and informal modes of learning. Formal learning 
takes place on a group-wide basis with the aim of institutionalising lessons. Take 
for example the IRA Green Book as a formal effort to distil best practice (“don’t 
be seen in the company of known republicans”), tactical tips (“our chief 
consideration in deciding tactics is the concern for friends, relatives, neighbours, 
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our people”), lifestyle recommendations (“drink-induced loose talk is the most 
potential danger facing any organisation”), and historical indoctrination (“control 
of our affairs in all of Ireland lies more than ever since 1921 outside the hands 
of the Irish people”).49  
 
Informal learning, conversely, takes places among individuals within groups and 
relies on social interaction or lessons gleaned from an informal arena, such as 
popular culture. One striking example of the informal lesson-learning legacy of 
popular culture on terrorist groups is the Tamil Tigers. Seasoned travel writer 
William Dalrymple spent time with the group in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. He 
recalled how when he was interviewing a senior Tiger commander in a jungle 
camp he was struck by similarities between the group’s tactics and scenes from 
Hollywood action movies. The Tiger leader replied with a smile: “Our camps are 
all equipped with videos. War films are shown three times a week and are 
compulsory. We often consult Predator and Rambo before planning ambushes. 
None of us are trained soldiers. We’ve learned all we know from these films.” 
Dalrymple perused their video collection to find it stocked with “complete sets of 
Rambo, Rocky and James Bond; all the Schwarzeneggers; most of the Vietnam 
films; and no less than three versions of The Magnificent Seven. It was 
wonderful: real freedom fighters earnestly studying Sylvester Stallone to see 
how it’s done.”50 Similarly, jihadists may learn from martyrdom biographies, 
religious stories and songs making these forms of learning worth further 
exploration.  
 
The third consideration of the character of the lesson is whether it relates to the 
tactical, operational or strategic level of terrorist activity. In state-led military 
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terms these are defined as battle and engagement, campaign plans and national 
security strategy and policy respectively. These are also applicable to terrorist 
learning. In an air hijacking for example, tactical lessons would relate to those 
committing the hijacking and may involve means to circumnavigate security on 
the ground. Operational lessons would relate to the leadership of the terrorist 
cell involved and the planning of the attack, such as studying airport blueprints 
or plane design to decide upon the specifics of the hijack. The strategic lessons 
would relate to the national or international leaders of the terrorist organisation 
and may be about the benefits of air hijacking, deciding upon the target and the 
actions to be taken after the operation is complete. Consequently, the different 
character of lessons can also directly relate to who is learning and vice versa.  
 
There are also several approaches in the literature to exploring the impact of 
lessons. Educational theorists, for example, distinguish between “deep” and 
“surface” lessons,51 whereby deep lessons critically challenge underlying 
assumptions and surface lessons examine events in isolation.52 Psychologists 
explore a similar idea in terms of “simple” and “complex” lessons. As such 
simple lessons are understood as impacting on a method but not a goal, 
therefore behaviour changes but not beliefs. Complex lessons, on the other 
hand, involve reconsidering both the method and the goal.53  
 
For organisational theorists the inclusion of feedback into the learning process 
leads to two new terms for a similar approach; single loop and double loop 
lessons.54 Single loop learning involves one feedback therefore leading to 
revaluation of an action in a form of instrumental learning, similar to the idea 
behind “simple” lessons. In contrast, double loop learning sees two feedbacks for 
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the learner, one for the action and one for the strategy or value behind such 
action, and therefore aligns closely to the idea of “complex” lessons in 
psychology. Consequently, although there are different terms and slight changes 
in approach to the analysis of lesson impacts it is clear that there is also much 
overlap between these three approaches.  
 
The majority of literature associated with terrorist learning has focused upon the 
outcomes of learning but have not explicitly considered characters of lessons. 
Instead research has often focused upon different impacts of lessons without 
drawing upon the mentioned theoretical approaches. They have focused upon 
tracing empirical observations of impact; change, adaption and innovation.55 
Dolnik, for example, creates a definition of innovation specific to the terrorism 
context: “an act of introduction of a new method or technology or the 
improvement of an already existing capability”, 56 but does not establish the 
concept as an outcome of a larger process of learning. To the 11 factors he cites 
as relevant to terrorist innovation, including group dynamics, resources and 
ideology, we would posit that the missing component of learning culture is a 
vitally important additional consideration.57  
 
A proposed analytical framework for terrorist learning 
 
What is terrorist learning? 
A definition of terrorist learning must reject the approach to defining learning by 
cognitive psychologists, as it incorrectly synonymises the appropriation of 
knowledge with learning. Whilst knowledge exchange may kick-start a learning 
process, learning is not the necessary outcome. In addition, learning is a process 
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and a causal mechanism that requires an impact, upon beliefs and/or behaviour, 
immediately or over time. A new definition must ensure a distinction between 
learning and change (such as innovation or adaptation). It is clear that change is 
an outcome of learning but also that learning can often reinforce existing ideas 
and actions thus negating the necessity for change as an outcome. In addition, 
an accuracy or efficiency criterion must be rejected as learning that does not 
improve efficacy is still learning nonetheless. Finally, academic definitions of 
learning have previously been criticised for being developed for the convenience 
of research. In 1966 the educational psychologist Stones noted that the 
definition of learning had quickly become wrapped up in the research of 
learning.58The organisational theorists, Argyris and Schön, were equally 
concerned that the political science approach to defining learning was detached 
from practiced reality.59 Consequently, to be usable by both scholars and 
practitioners the new definition must be universally workable in research and in 
practice.  
 
It is proposed that terrorist learning be defined as:  
The acquisition of knowledge to inform terrorist related activities in the future.  
 
In this definition the “who” is intentionally learner neutral, as different learners 
will be examined, but focuses upon those with terrorist intent rather than 
examining terrorist recruiting tools. It is also unspecific about “what is learned”, 
defined only as “knowledge”. However, it would not be sufficient to define 
terrorist learning as only “the acquisition of knowledge to inform activities in the 
future” as this is merely learning. The inclusion of “terrorist related” situates this 
definition within the study of terrorism. The “how learning occurs”, states only 
16 
 
“acquisition of knowledge” allowing research to consider different processes of 
learning.  
 
The outcome within the definition is defined as “to inform terrorist related 
activities in the future”. The use of the term “activities” does not predispose that 
learning only impacts behaviour but that terrorists must engage, or plan to 
engage, in terrorist activities to be so defined as terrorists. Therefore the word 
“inform” is also important to stress the impact of learning upon beliefs. 
Nonetheless, both “inform” and “activities” reveal that learning has an impact. 
Thus this definition extends the ideas of cognitive psychologists to clearly 
establish learning as a process.  
 
The definition does not include an accuracy or efficiency criterion as learning the 
“wrong” lesson remains learning nonetheless. In addition, no outcome is 
required immediately, only “in the future”, offering potential and allowing 
learning to be a long-term process if required. There is also no defined outcome 
for either the character or impact of learning; learning does not have to result in 
change, innovation or adaption, it may result in a number of different outcomes. 
Consequently, it is hoped that this definition provides sufficient rigidity for 
operationalising research, but flexibility for investigation. For the same reasons 
the endeavour for this definition is that is can be applied by both academics and 
practitioners in the study of terrorist learning. 
 




It is clear from the literature that learning has involved research of a number of 
learners but always focused upon one exclusively at the expense of others. 
Research on terrorist learning must extend this work by drawing upon multi-
disciplinary approaches from psychology, organisation theory and sociology and 
endeavour to examine all four relevant learners; terrorist individuals, terrorist 
organisations, groups of terrorists, and generations of terrorists.  
 
In addition, learners interact with each other and are part of each other. For 
example, terrorist individuals form terrorist groups, organisations and 
generations, whilst within terrorist organisations there are terrorist groups, 
generations and individuals. No learner exists in a vacuum or is mutually 
exclusive from the others. Consequently research into terrorist learning would 
benefit from considering learners as spheres of learning that overlap and interact 
(as illustrated in figure 1). 
 





These spheres each represent a terrorist learner. In this case individual terrorist 
learners are represented by the “individual” sphere, terrorist organisations by 
the “organisational” sphere, groups of terrorists by the “social” sphere and 
generations of terrorist by the “generational” sphere.  
 
The centre of the diagram, where the four spheres overlap, is where terrorist 
learning will occur that will be the most effective because learning will be 
conducted by all learners. It is, therefore, at this intersection where initial 
counter-terrorist approaches should focus to have the greatest impact, before 
19 
 
moving from the centre out into other areas of overlap between two or three 
spheres and finally the remaining isolated spheres.  
 
What are the processes of terrorist learning? 
 
Learning is a process, not one action, that occurs over several stages. Drawing 
upon, but extending, the work of Huber, we understand the terrorist learning 
process as comprising four stages; identification, distribution, implementation 
and retention (as illustrated in figure 2). The identification of a lesson is always 
the first stage in the learning process as it is at this stage that, in line with our 
definition of terrorist learning, the “acquisition of knowledge” occurs and such 
knowledge is interpreted into a lesson relevant for “informing terrorist activities 
in the future”. Consequently, this singular stage unites two of the stages 
distinguished by Huber as “acquisition” and “interpretation” as they are 
inextricably linked in identifying a lesson (as illustrated in figure 3). In addition, 
in some cases a lesson can be identified as needed, leading to acquisition. This, 
therefore, would form an additional step before the process begins; however, 
the process remains the same as the specifics of the knowledge acquisitioned 










Figure 2: Illustration of the process of learning 
 
 





Understanding from where the knowledge for terrorism is acquired and 
interpreted is a fertile area of research, and has already resulted in a formidable 
volume edited by Forest.60 However, more can be achieved. The study of lesson 
identification can examine lessons from internal and external sources,61 methods 
of lesson identification, such as self-reflection or trial and error testing, and 
consider whether these methods are formal, ongoing and routine – and thereby 
more easily subject to disruption – or informal or only occur in extraordinary 
circumstances and therefore may prove more challenging to counter. Patterns of 
lesson identification can be reflected upon, as some terrorist learners may seek 
to only identify lessons from internal sources rather than risk infiltration, whilst 
others may routinely be using external sources that may provide a weak link for 
counter-terrorist operations. 
 
Once identification has occurred the process of learning may continue to any of 
the other three stages; there is no necessary order. Lesson distribution involves 
the sharing of the lesson with other learners. When the learner is the 
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organisational, social or generational sphere of terrorist learning distribution can 
be internal and external – with other terrorist organisations, terrorists groups of 
individuals and generations of terrorists whereby the learner becomes the 
teacher. When the learner is in the individual sphere learning can only be 
distributed externally. Lesson distribution from one learner becomes the 
acquisition of knowledge for another and hence can significantly improve the 
resilience of a terrorist organisation. This is why understanding this process is so 
important for counter-terrorism. A number of researchers within terrorism 
studies have examined this process through the concepts of “contagion”62 or 
“diffusion”.63 In addition, some work has been conducted into the methods of 
lesson distribution, such as internet videos or apprenticeships, but more is 
needed.64  
 
The stage of retention is where a lesson is recorded for the future. In some 
cases lessons are not ready for implementation, they are “to inform terrorist 
related activities in the future”. In other cases lessons are implemented but need 
to be retained for future learners, as suggested by literature on connectivism. In 
organisational theory the formal retention of lessons becomes known as 
“organisational memory”, whereas in social theory less formal retention can 
occur though tradition, symbols or language. Retention is significant as if lessons 
are not retained they may become unlearned over time and research into 
retention may provide counterterrorist practitioners with targets that could be 
destroyed, infiltrated to provide misinformation, or monitored to reveal terrorist 




In the implementation stage of the learning process the lesson is used for 
terrorist activities, hence this also becomes an outcome of terrorist learning. At 
this stage the potential for the lesson becomes a reality and can be claimed to 
have been “learned”. The implementation stage is a crucial opportunity for 
counter-terrorism operations to disturb terrorist activities. It is therefore also 
important that this is a defined stage within the learning process, thus rejecting 
the uniting of “implementation” with “distribution” in the framework produced by 
Huber. 
 
What are the outcomes of terrorist learning? 
Terrorist learning results in terrorist lessons with different characters and 
impacts, and the two are often interlinked. How these lessons are implemented 
forms part of the “implementation” stage of the learning process. Lessons can be 
positive or negative, explicit or tacit, tactical, operational or strategic. These 
lessons have different impacts upon beliefs, behaviour or both. Positive lessons 
usually have the impact of reinforcing existing beliefs or behaviour, whilst 
negative lessons often create change, through adaption, evolution or innovation. 
Explicit or tacit lessons can each lead to a variety of impacts, that are not as 
predetermined by the lesson character as positive or negative lessons, but often 
explicit lessons will impact upon the technical and tacit lessons upon the 
practical. Tactical, operational and strategic lessons are equally not 
predetermined but tactical lessons are more likely to impact behaviour and 
strategic lessons to impact beliefs. 
 
The impact upon beliefs and behaviour are akin to the approaches of deep and 
surface lessons, simple and complex lessons and single and double loop lessons, 
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which are found within the learning literature. In this case surface, simple and 
single loop lessons impact behaviour only whilst deep, complex and double loop 
lessons impact beliefs and/or behaviour (in his study of learning in the British 
Army, Catignani categorises these respectively as “lower level” and “higher 
level” learning66). Consequently, the inclusion of the labelling of such lessons 
becomes unnecessary and the focus of research on terrorist outcomes can 
simply consider learning in relation to whether beliefs or behaviour (or both) are 
impacted by the lesson and whether this impact is reinforcement or change. An 
examination of both the characters and impacts, as the outcomes of terrorist 
learning, will enable the identification of patterns of learning and consideration of 
what types of lessons are being learned in an endeavour to predict, and prevent, 
future terrorist learning outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
Terrorist learning is happening now. Every day terrorists are seeking to learn in 
order to improve their chances of achieving their objectives. To thwart terrorist 
success terrorist learning must be tackled and addressed. In order for this to be 
possible it is crucial for counter-terrorist practitioners to understand how 
terrorists learn; what learning is, who is learning and what are the processes 
and outcomes of terrorist learning. However, in order to ascertain how terrorist 
learning occurs a full understanding of the learning process is required; the 
current literature on terrorist learning generally focuses on one particular learner 
or only one stage of the learning process.  
 
This paper, therefore, has endeavoured to draw upon the vast learning 
literature, as well as state-based and existing terrorist learning literature, to 
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develop a new framework for use by academics and practitioners. This 
framework reveals the full process of terrorist learning,demonstrating crucial and 
fertile areas for future research and points of weakness for exploitation in 
counter-terrorist operations. In addition to areas already discussed, research is 
required into and between different learners as each terrorist agent is different, 
just as no two state actors learn in the same way. There is also worthwhile 
large-N research to be conducted using this framework to examine wider 
patterns of terrorist learning and to consider whether the learning process can 
be anticipated. For example, can patterns be traced between the source of 
knowledge that is acquired and the outcome of learning; if, for example, 
knowledge is acquired from experts are the outcomes likely to be explicit and 
tactical lessons? Equally, can patterns be derived between the learner and the 
outcome, such as the social sphere resulting in the outcome of operational 
lessons with an impact upon the practical by adaptation? In addition, barriers 
that prevent or halt the learning process can be identified, in order that these 
barriers can be replicated by counterterrorist operatives. 
 
Research into terrorist learning is not easy; it is fraught with methodological and 
ethical difficulties. However, as noted by the RAND report, the current lack of 
data on different parts of the terrorist learning process is a “major handicap” in 
completing an understanding of terrorist learning.67 Research into terrorist 
learning is also urgent and important and it is hoped that the provision of an 
analytical framework is the first stage in encouraging expansion into this 
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